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abstract — One of the effects of climate change is an increase in extreme weather and natural
disasters. Unless CO2 emissions are significantly reduced very soon, it is inevitable that the effects of
disaster  will  exceed  many  (and  ultimately  all)  societies’  mitigation  capacity.  Compounding
unmitigated disaster effects will slowly but surely push a society towards collapse. Because no part
of the planet is safe from the increase in natural disaster intensity and because some of the effects
of disasters – such as refugees and economic decline – spill over boundaries, this will eventually
lead to global societal collapse. Furthermore, just reducing CO2 emissions is insufficient to prevent
this, as disaster intensity is expected to exceed mitigation capacity in some global regions within
one or two decades from now. To avoid a cascade of collapse it is necessary to reverse economic
globalization  and  decrease  long-distance  trade,  as  well  as  to  implement  a  global  resettlement
program for the increasing number of climate refugees.
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1. introduction
There is broad consensus within climate science that CO2-induced global  warming will
lead to more extreme weather and an increase in the frequency and severity of natural
disasters such as storms (including hurricanes and typhoons), droughts, and floods (IPCC
2014; 2018; UNDRR 2019). We are already experiencing this increase, and the situation is
expected to get much worse, and to continue getting worse for many decades to come.
In this paper, I will use a very simple model to show that this will inevitably lead to
global  societal  collapse,  unless appropriate  preventive  action is  taken.  The  core  of  the
model is the rather simple and obvious idea that if disasters continuously increase, while
mitigation capacity does not (and cannot) keep up with that increase, then it is inevitable
that there will be a point at which a society can no longer cope with disaster and starts to
decline.
A formal description of the model is presented in section 2, and its main implications
are  discussed  in  section  3.  It  is  argued  that  refugee  flows  and  the  economic
interdependence resulting from globalized trade make collapse difficult  to contain,  and
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that because no part of the planet is safe from increasing natural disaster intensity, societal
collapse will eventually become global. Section 4 explains the model and its implications in
plain language for readers who are uncomfortable with equations.  After that,  section 5
looks into the difficulties in fitting the model to the real world in order to make reliable
predictions, and section 6 discusses the model’s implications for the prevention of global
societal collapse. What is required is a fast reduction of CO2 emissions, de-globalization,
and refugee resettlement. The final section compares the model with some other models
and predictions of collapse and recapitulates this paper’s main findings.
2. formal description of the model
The purpose of the theoretical model is to explain the relation between natural disasters
and societal  collapse.  It  is  assumed that  societal  collapse corresponds to a (very) high
value on a  scale  measuring civic  unrest.  Hence,  the  main endogenous  variable  is  civic
unrest  u and the  main exogenous  variable is disaster intensity  d. Important endogenous
variables  in  addition  to  u are  the  state  of  the  economy  e,  mitigation  capacity  c,
displacement of people r, and physical and psychological health issues h.
With one exception (namely, expected economic growth g), all variables are relative to
population size (of the society/country modeled), and specific to a given year. Variables
without an index refer to the given year; the index “−1” refers to the previous year; and the
index  “n”  is  a  placeholder  that  stands  for  some year.  The  delta symbol  Δ  means  the
difference in value between a year and the previous year; thus Δy = y − y−1. Most equations
include a variable x to represent external effects that are outside the scope of the model, as
well as a variable i to represent interaction effects between endogenous variables.
All unspecified functions are assumed to be continuously increasing and close to linear.
All inputs are assumed to be positively related to the output. Where necessary, a  minus
sign is added: if z is a function of y such that z and y are inversely related, then z = fyz(−y).
As  in  this  example,  all  functions  are  identified  by  a  two-letter  index  –  the  first  letter
identifies the main input variable; the second letter the output variable.
Disaster intensity  d,  the main exogenous variable, is a measure of the frequency and
severity of natural disasters in a given society or area. It can be roughly defined as the
number of people in a society or country that were affected by natural disasters in the
given year, multiplied by the length of their exposure to the effects of those disasters (or
that  disaster)  and  the  severity  of  those  effects,  divided  by  population  size.  It  is
uncontroversial among climate scientists that climate change will lead to more extreme
weather and an increase in the frequency and severity of natural disasters such as storms,
droughts,  and  floods  (IPCC 2014;  2018;  UNDRR 2019).  This  increase  in  the  disaster
intensity will continue for decades, and possibly even centuries, although it is still possible
to  significantly  reduce  the  rate  and  extent  of  that  increase.  Nevertheless,  at  least  on
decadal timescales, it is expected that the average yearly increase in disaster intensity is
greater than zero:
[D] ⟨Δdn⟩ > 0
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The social effects of natural disasters are grouped into three different kinds: economic
effects, displacement of people, and a variety of broadly health-related effects including
mortality. The severity of these effects depends on disaster intensity, but also on a society’s
mitigation capacity c – that is, its ability to cope with disaster: to provide food and shelter
to displaced people, to maintain public order, to help the sick and wounded and prevent
epidemics, to repair the damage, and so forth.
Mitigation  capacity  depends  on  a  number  of  factors.  For  example,  tightly  knit
communities may be much more resilient in the face of disaster, and other kinds of social
capital  also  improve  resilience (e.g. Aldrich  & Meyer 2015).  However,  on national  and
larger scales, wealth is the most important determinant of a society’s ability to cope with
or  mitigate  natural  disasters.  Consequently,  a  change  in  c is  primarily  dependent  on
economic growth Δe:
[C] c = c−1 + fec(Δe) + xc
Economic damage due to national disasters consists of two components: losses due to
temporary  halts  and  setbacks  in  production  and  distribution,  and  losses  due  to  the
destruction  of  infrastructure  and  economic  facilities  (i.e. the  facilities  involved  in
production and distribution of  goods  and services).  Losses  of  the  second kind can be
compensated to some extent by rebuilding and repairs,  and in favorable circumstances
investments can even lead to a growth in economic infrastructure and facilities p. Hence, 
[P] Δp = − fdp(p−1, d) + fcp(p−1, c) + xp ,
in which “−fdp(p−1, d)” determines the loss of economic infrastructure and facilities due to
disaster, and “+fcp(p−1, c)” the gains due to reconstruction, recovery, and investment. Losses
depend mostly on disaster intensity d, while reconstruction and repair of disaster damage
primarily depends on mitigation capacity c.
The aggregate economic effect of disaster, reconstruction, and other relevant factors is
modeled as follows:
[E] e = g×e−1 − fde(d, e−1) + fpe(Δp, e−1) − ie + t + xe ,
in which g stands for “expected economic growth”, “−fde(d, e−1)” is economic damage due to
temporal halts and setbacks in production, “+fpe(Δp, e−1)” is economic losses and gains due
to  the  change  in  economic  infrastructure  and  facilities  Δp (which  itself  depends  on
disasters and reconstruction; see [P] above), and t represents the contribution of trade to
the state of the economy. (As mentioned above, i stands for interaction effects, which will
be discussed below, while  x represents external effects that are outside the scope of the
model.) Δe, which plays a role in [C] as well some equations below, is e − e−1.
Expected  economic  growth  g is  the  economic  growth  that  the  society  modeled  (or
similar societies) could reasonably be expected to experience if  it  would not be hit  by
natural disasters in the given year, or at least not by more disasters than what used to be
normal. For the past half century, the global average growth rate has been between 2% and
4% mostly (which would suggest a value for g between 1.02 and 1.04), but it dipped below
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zero  in  2009,  and  there  has  been  considerable  difference  between  countries.  For  the
model, this does not matter much, but it complicates application to the real world. (See
section 5.)
Mitigation capacity c co-determines the extent of economic recovery from disasters, but
plays an equally – if not even more – important role in the non-economic direct effects of
natural disasters: displacement of people, and physical and psychological health-related
problems. Displaced people include evacuees and refugees. (The difference between those
two groups is merely one of the extent of assistance offered: evacuees are helped with food
and shelter, while refugees are left to tend for themselves.) The share of displaced people
in the population r depends on disaster intensity, mitigation, and migration m:
[R] r = r−1 + fdr(d) − fcr(r−1, c) + ir + m + xr ,
in which “+fdr(d)” determines the increase in the relative number of evacuees and refugees
due to disaster, “−fcr(r−1, c)” the number of displaced people who are fully (re-)integrated
into society and thereby lose their “displaced” status, and m is the number of immigrating
displaced people (from societies/countries other than the one modeled) minus emigrating
displaced people. The extent to which a society is able to provide appropriate housing and
income to evacuees, refugees, and immigrants – that is,  fcr(r−1, c) – is primarily dependent
on the society’s mitigation capacity c.
Health-related problems h are a rather broad category in the model, including mortality,
injuries,  and the effects of  shortages of food and water,  as well  as physical and mental
diseases  and  disorders  –  such  as  epidemics,  PTSD,  anxiety,  depression,  increased
aggression, and so forth – either resulting directly from natural disasters, or arising in a
disaster’s aftermath (Watts et al. 2017; Clayton et al. 2017; Evans 2019). Not all effects of
disaster are immediate. For example, the main effects of drought only start to realize after
the harvest fails and supplies run out; psychological effects can develop slowly and last for
many years; and the health effects of famine often last a lifetime.
In the model,  h is a measure for the sum of all  of these physical and mental health
problems in the population, and is determined as follows:
[H] h = h−1 + fdh(d) − fch(h−1, c) + ih + xh ,
in which “+fdh(d)” stands for the increase of health-related problems due to disaster, and
“−fch(h−1, c)” for a decrease due to mitigation.
The three main equations that model direct disaster effects – [E],  [R],  and [H] – all
include  interaction  effects.  Economic  decline  can  lead  to  voluntary  migration  (i.e.
displacement),  for  example,  and  to  stress  and  other  health  effects;  displacement  has
physical  and mental  health  effects,  and potential  economic  effects  as  well;  and health-
related problems also tend to have economic effects  and may also cause displacement
(especially in the case of epidemics). Furthermore, in such interaction effects both changes
in and levels of variables play a role. For example, both economic decline (Δe<0) and low
economic development (a low value on e) affect voluntary migration. And the other way
around, both the relative number of refugees r and a change therein Δr affect the economy.
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[I] ie = fie(Δr, r, Δh, h, Δu, u)
ir = fir(−Δe, −e, Δh, h, Δu, u)
ih = fih(−Δe, −e, Δr, r, Δu, u)
What is important to realize about these interaction effects is that they are effectively
multipliers of disaster effects. They do not change the nature and/or direction of effects,
but  merely  speed  them  up  and  reinforce  them.  This  multiplier  effect  should  not  be
overestimated, however,  except that at very high levels of civic unrest (i.e. in case of civil
war or similar social  breakdown), the effects thereof are likely to exceed the effects of
natural disaster.
Civic  unrest  u itself  is  assumed  to  depend  on  economic  decline  and  increases  in
displacement and health-related problems:
[U] u = u−1 − feu(Δe) + fru(Δr) + fhu(Δh) + xu
Civic  unrest  –  in  the  sense  intended  here  –  is  the  deterioration  of  faith  in,  and
acceptance of the socio-political status quo. Dmitry Orlov (2013) argued that subsequent
stages of collapse are tied to “the breaching of a specific level of trust, or faith, in the status
quo” (p.  14).  In Gramscian terms,  such a deterioration of  faith  and/or  acceptance is a
breakdown of (cultural) hegemony.  Gramsci (1971) introduced the term “hegemony” to
describe the acceptance and/or consent that the socio-political status quo depends on (see
also Brons 2017). Without hegemony, only brute force can keep a socio-political system or
class in control, but brute force is costly and inefficient. An increase in civic unrest is the
undermining of acceptance/consent (and trust or faith, as Orlov suggested, but those are
very closely related to acceptance and consent). At low levels, civic unrest may only be
expressed at  the  voting  booth;  at  higher  levels  riots  may occur;  and at  extreme levels
acceptance of the socio-political status quo completely evaporates and a society collapses
into chaos or civil war. Well before that highest level is reached certain parts of society may
already  have  collapsed,  however.  Economic  decline  can  lead  to  financial  collapse
independently from civic unrest, for example (but in most circumstances, financial collapse
would significantly raise the civic unrest level).
For  convenience,  the  main  equations  of  the  model,  as  well  as  assumption  [D],  are
reprinted here:
[D] ⟨Δdn⟩ > 0
[C] c = c−1 + fec(Δe) + xc
[P] Δp = − fdp(p−1, d) + fcp(p−1, c) + xp
[E] e = g×e−1 − fde(d, e−1) + fpe(Δp, e−1) − ie + t + xe
[R] r = r−1 + fdr(d) − fcr(r−1, c) + ir + m + xr
[H] h = h−1 + fdh(d) − fch(h−1, c) + ih + xh
[U] u = u−1 − feu(Δe) + fru(Δr) + fhu(Δh) + xu
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3. implications
An obvious implication of [E] is that – if  trade and external effects are kept constant –
actual economic growth Δe depends on the ratio of expected growth  g to the economic
effects  of  disaster  (−fde(d, e−1)+fpe(Δp, e−1)−ie)/e−1.  However,  while  g is  either  fixed  or
fluctuating within fairly narrow margins (see also section 5), [D] implies that the economic
(and other) effects of disaster are increasing, and will continue to increase. Consequently,
from [D] and [E] it follows that any economy will eventually start to decline. That is,  if
disaster intensity continues to increase – as climate scientists expect to be the case in
“business as usual” scenarios (IPCC 2014; 2018) – then inevitably, disaster damage will at
some point exceed economic growth, and thus cause decline. 
Furthermore, a society’s mitigation capacity c is primarily dependent on the state of its
economy, which implies that relative to the state of the economy,  c is constant or even
declining. Hence, what [D], [E], and [C] together make explicit is the basic fact that if –
relative to the state and size of the economy – the frequency and severity of disasters (and
therefore,  disaster damage) continue to grow while mitigation capacity is  more or less
stable or even declining, then it is inevitable that at some point disasters will exceed the
ability to cope, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1.
This point may be far in the future for rich countries in global regions that experience
relatively few major disasters, but it is much closer by for poorer countries in disaster-
prone  regions.  In  2017,  the  economy  of  Puerto  Rico  (and  much  more  than  just  the
economy) was almost completely destroyed by two hurricanes, for example.
When mitigation capacity can no longer keep up with disasters,  the social effects of
(ever-increasing) natural disasters start compounding fast. Damaged infrastructure can no
longer be repaired, the growing number of displaced people can no longer be meaningfully
assisted or (re)integrated into society, health-related problems such as PTSD, anxiety, and
epidemics explode, and the economy plummets (see [P], [R], [H], and [E], respectively).
And according to [U], all of these effects will lead to an increase in dissatisfaction and civic
unrest.
If trade, migration, and external effects that are outside the scope of the model have no
significant  effects,  then  the  model  implies  that  with  a  continuous  increase  in  disaster
damage, there will be a continuous increase in civic unrest, which will eventually result in
societal  collapse.  Unless  there  are  major  oversights  in  this  model,  this  outcome  is  as
inevitable  as  it  is  obvious.  Furthermore,  even without the  assumption of  continuously
increasing  disaster  intensity  [D],  eventual  collapse  is  inevitable  if  average  disaster
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intensity dd  reaches such a level that the effects of natural disasters exceed the mitigation
capacity of a country or society. (This should be obvious from figure 1 above. The dotted
line does not need to continue increasing, if it flattens out  after crossing the continuous
line then the effect will be the same.)
Trade,  migration,  and external  effects  may both  hasten  or  slow  down collapse,  but
cannot prevent it in a world where no society is safe from increasing disasters. The most
important external effects in a single, isolated society are social and cultural circumstances
that lead to a larger mitigation capacity (e.g. Aldrich & Meyer 2015) – that is xc in [C] – and
cultural circumstances and socio-political events that decrease unrest – that is  xu in [U].
Both could slow down the rise of civic unrest considerably.
If the model is applied to multiple, interacting societies (rather than a single, isolated
society)  there is another important external  effect with regards to mitigation.  That is,
international aid can substitute for (and/or complement) autonomous mitigation. Even if a
society’s own mitigation capacity is low, some of the effects of natural disasters may be
relatively small if mitigation is paid for or provided by other societies. This is only possible
if those other countries have surplus mitigation capacity, of course. However, because no
societies will be spared from the increase in natural disasters and other negative effects of
climate change, it is expected that mitigation capacity will decline globally – although not
at a universal speed – and therefore, that cross-border assistance will gradually dwindle.
(See also sections 5 and 6.)
Much more important than these external effects are migration m in [R] and trade t in
[E].  Displaced people tend to migrate when their host society – for whatever reason –
becomes too inhospitable. Or to put this another way, growing refugee populations tend to
spill over national borders, adding to the populations of displaced people in those adjacent
countries. And by migrating, refugees somewhat release the pressure in the countries or
societies they leave, but  increase the pressure in their new host society. (That is, if they
leave society A for B, then they reduce Δr in A and increase Δr in B, which according to [U],
if everything else is equal, leads to a decrease in civic unrest u in A and an increase in B.)
Especially if numbers of immigrating refugees are much larger than the host society can
handle (i.e. well beyond its mitigation capacity), then immigration can lead to a significant
rise in civic unrest.
Trade makes economies partially dependent on the economies of their trade partners. If
two adjacent societies trade a lot of what they produce with each other (which is the case
for many pairs of adjacent societies), then a significant economic decline in one of the two
will  in almost all  cases cause an economic decline in the other.  (Except,  of  course,  if  A
trades with B and C, and although B declines, this decline is compensated by a growth in C.
In a world of universal decline, this can only provide temporary relief, however.)
Trade and migration can both spread and mitigate the effects of  disaster – they are
similar in that respect – but they differ in their spatial scales.  Most migration takes place
over relatively short distance, while trade is far less spatially restricted. There is a vast
global trade network that connects places and societies all over the planet. If such long-
distance  links  are  ignored,  societies  approaching  collapse  would  only  affect  their
neighbors  (through  declining  trade  and  increasing  migration),  pushing  those  closer
towards collapse as well, and societal collapse would spread slowly like an oil-stain. But
the global trade network ties societies together over much larger distances, and a collapse
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of that network (due to societal collapse of major players in that network) would probably
be a tipping point in the spread of societal collapse, sending a shock-wave of economic
decline  and  deteriorating  mitigation  capacity  all  around  the  globe.  What  started  as  a
regional  security  issue then suddenly  becomes a  global  problem with  potentially  fatal
consequences.
4. plain language summary of the model and its implications
One of the most important effects of climate change is an increase in natural disasters and
extreme weather such as storms,  droughts,  and floods.  Such natural  disasters have (at
least)  three  kinds  of  social  effects:  economic  damage,  displacement  of  people  (that  is,
refugees and evacuees),  and a range of health-related problems ranging from injury or
even death to PTSD and anxiety.
If the economic damage of disasters exceeds economic growth, then the economy starts
to decline, which affects a society’s mitigation capacity (that is, its ability to cope with the
effects of disaster). The lower the mitigation capacity of a society, the less it can do to
(re)integrate or otherwise help displaced people, and the less it can do to counter health
problems  caused  directly  or  indirectly  by  natural  disasters.  Then,  the  population  of
displaced  people  (which  then  mainly  consists  of  refugees)  as  well  as  health-related
problems  start  to  increase  fast.  Furthermore,  all  three  direct  effects  of  disasters  –
economic decline, displaced people, and health-related problems – lead to an increase of
dissatisfaction and civic unrest.
Figure 2. A graphical representation of the model
Figure 2 is a graphical representation of these relations and effects. Disasters and the
three other circles with continuous outlines continue to increase,  while the two circles
with dotted outlines continue to decrease. All of these changes are ultimately dependent
on  the  predicted  increase  of  the  frequency  and  severity  of  natural  disasters.  If  those
continue to grow, then it  is  inevitable that a  level  will  be  reached at which mitigation
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capacity approaches zero. And unmitigated effects of disasters lead to civic unrest, which
then continues to rise until the society collapses into chaos or civil war.
The  figure  also  shows  two  arrows  coming  from  the  outside.  The  arrow  leading  to
displaced  people  represents  immigration  of  refugees  from  adjacent  societies  (and/or
emigration to them). The arrow leading to the economy represents the effects of trade. If
the economy of important trade partners declines, then so does the economy of the society
modeled. In other words, what these two arrows mean is that if a society is situated in a
part of the world that is approaching collapse, then that society will be negatively affected
thereby, pulling that society closer to collapse as well. Because ultimately all countries are
adjacent and all  countries are part of  the same global  trade network, this implies that
societal  collapse  will  gradually  spread  throughout  this  network  (and  thus,  the  whole
world).
This effect  only accelerates global  societal  collapse,  however,  and does not  cause it.
What causes it is the mathematical certainty that when disaster damage keeps increasing,
it will at some point surpass a society’s ability to cope with and mitigate disaster, because
that ability depends on economic growth which cannot continuously increase.  In other
words,  if  natural  disasters  continue  to  occur  more  often  and  continue  to  cause  more
damage, then societal collapse will inevitably follow. It may be far away for some countries
(and  much  closer  by  for  others),  but  no  country  can  outrun  continuously  increasing
disasters forever.
5. the model as a tool for prediction
The model  and its  implications  presented in the  preceding sections raise  two obvious
questions:  What  is  the  most  likely  time-frame  for  societal  collapse?  And  can  it  be
prevented? The second question will be discussed in section 6. The first – as well as some
closely related questions – will be addressed here.
Answering the question about likely time-frames for societal collapse would require a
much more sophisticated simulation model than the simple theoretical model presented
above.  And  while  some  of  the  extensions  and  adaptations  needed  are  fairly  easy  to
implement,  some  others  would  be  very  hard  and/or  controversial.  For  example,  a
simulation  model  would  need  a  demographic  module  to  model  births,  deaths,  and
migration  for  residential  and  displaced  populations  as  well  as  transfers  between
residential and displaced populations. This is relatively easy.
It  would  also  need  a  distinction  between  kinds  of  disasters  because  the  model  as
presented in section 2 implies that the mix of effects is the same for all disasters, and while
that is not a problematic assumption in a theoretical model (as long as economic damage
and non-economic disaster  effects  are continuously increasing with increasing disaster
intensity, then the relative sizes of these effects does not matter), it would be a serious flaw
in a more realistic simulation. Distinguishing kinds of disasters is not a problem in itself,
but it aggravates another obstacles in developing the model into a realistic simulation.
Estimating all the functions in the equations of the model requires a lot of reliable data
of the right kind, but much of the data needed is unavailable or insufficiently reliable. It is
hard to find detailed and reliable information about disaster damage (especially in less
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developed countries), for example, and the more categories of disasters a model would
distinguish, the more data it would need to estimate the functions determining the effects
of all those different kinds of disaster. 
Furthermore, there are no single, unambiguous, and uncontroversial ways to measure
most  of  the main  variables  in  the  model,  and  different  choices  with  regards  to
operationalization  and  measurement  will  lead  to  different  outcomes.  Health-related
problems h and civic unrest u are, perhaps, the most obvious examples of this problem, but
measuring the state and size of  the economy  e is  not  much less  problematic.  GDP per
capita may seem an obvious choice, but there is a sizable literature arguing against GDP
(or GDP/capita) as a good measure of economic health  (e.g. Vaury 2007). There may be
good  reasons  to  exclude  the  financial  sector,  for  example.  If  the  economic  role  of  the
financial sector is to extract wealth from the “real economy” without contributing to it, as
Michael  Hudson (2015) and many others have argued, then an increase in GDP due to
growth of the financial sector is more likely to decrease mitigation capacity than increase
it.  This  is  controversial,  of  course,  but  that is  exactly  the  point  – almost  everything in
economics is controversial, even if many (orthodox) economists pretend it is not.
For  the  same  reason  there  is  no  uncontroversial  way  to  model  expected  economic
growth  g either. Many economists would suggest to fix it at approximately 2%, because
that has been more or less the target or standard level for developed countries in the past
decades. But this would ignore economic crises and other fluctuations (because those do
not  exist  according  to  mainstream  economic  models).  Furthermore,  economists  who
emphasize the role of debt, such as Steve Keen (2017) or Michael  Hudson (2015), argue
that many countries have become (or will soon become) “debt zombies” with growth rates
that are close to zero. And according to advocates of “peak oil” or other resource peak
theories,  economic  growth will  start  to decline soon under  the influence of  increasing
resource scarcity (Heinberg 2007; Hall & Klitgaard 2018). Choosing any of these (or other)
alternatives will offend adherents of the competing options.
Perhaps,  the  hardest  problems  of  all,  however,  have  to  do  with  civil  unrest  u.  As
mentioned above, there may not be an unambiguous and uncontroversial measure of  u,
but even if there would be one, the data necessary for reliable estimates of the economic
and other effects of unrest (i.e. the role of u in the functions in [I]) and of the thresholds in
civic unrest that lead to riots, civil war, and societal collapse probably does not exist. For
the purely theoretical model this is irrelevant because all  that matters is that  infinitely
increasing civic unrest will eventually lead to societal collapse, but for a simulation that is
supposed to produce predictions this is a very serious problem.
Technically, creating a simulation model based on the foregoing is not difficult, on the
other  hand.  It  can  be  done  in  a  standard  spreadsheet  in  one  or  two  days.  Probably
unsurprisingly, I did. I created a simulation with an 8×8 grid of countries, two kinds of
randomly occurring disasters (frequent and small, and infrequent and large, with different
mixes of effects), and an additional module to simulate demographics including migration.
Health effects were reduced to mortality,  so the simulation did not take other kinds of
health-related  problems  and  their  effects  into  account.  To  increase  realism,  the  64
countries  in the  simulation could start  at  different  economic  levels  and with  different
propensities for the two kinds of  disasters.  The effects  of  disasters were based on a –
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undoubtedly  non-representative  –  sample  of  recent  disasters.  And  to  simulate  model-
external decreases in civic unrest another random effect was added.
Depending  on  model  settings  (i.e. extent  of  disaster  damage,  growth  of  disaster
intensity, expected economic growth g, and so forth), simulations predicted global societal
collapse in between 20 and 40 years from now (with a few simulations with very extreme
settings outside that range),  with most  of  them in the 25 to 30 years range.  However,
because of the problems explained in the preceding paragraphs, these predictions should
probably be taken with a very large grain of salt. (And it is also for this reason that I do not
give a detailed description of the simulation model and its parameters here.)
Consequently, as a tool for prediction the model (either in its original abstract form or
in the form of the derived simulation) is pretty much useless. Predicting the time until
global  societal  collapse was  never  the  intended purpose of  the  model  presented here,
however. Rather, its purpose was and is twofold: firstly, to show that if disaster intensity
continues to increase as climate scientists predict, then eventual global societal collapse is
a mathematical certainty; and secondly, to gain insight on how to prevent or mitigate that
collapse (see next section). Nevertheless, if there are other reasons to believe that global
societal collapse is likely within the time frame that the simulation model suggests, that
would at least provide some additional support for the model.
Given the inertia of social systems, the lower bound of the 20 to 40 years window of
probable collapse does not seem implausible. Except in case of nuclear war, widespread
financial  collapse,  or  some other extreme event,  rich Western nations are not going to
collapse soon – even if the rest of the world is collapsing around them. What seems more
questionable than this lower bound is the upper bound, however.
Right now, the average global temperature is approximately 1°C higher than the 1950
baseline (and more than 1.5°C higher than before the industrial revolution). We will reach
1.5°C by 2030 and 2°C soon after 2040 (Xu, Ramanathan, & Victor 2018). These may seem
like small numbers, but they have big effects. Many food crops become less productive at
higher temperatures. Rice yields drop by about 10% for every 1°C above the ideal average
temperature of 25°C, for example, and heat waves above 35°C at the wrong time of year
will lead to crop failure for a wide range of essential crops (Hatfield  et al. 2011). Much
more important than the direct effect of heat is the effect of drought, however. The small
difference between 1.5°C of  average global  warming in 2030 and 2°C soon after  2040
corresponds to a vast difference in exposure to the effects of drought. At 1.5°C less than
10% of the land surface and world population will be affected by aridification (i.e. severe
drying), but at 2°C these percentages rise to between 24% and 32% of land surface and
between 18% and 24% of world population (Park  et al. 2018).  That is  a two- or even
three-fold increase of the number of people suffering the effects of severe drought in one
decade.  Another  recent  study  suggests  that  two  thirds  of  the  world  population  will
experience an increase of drought with warming, and that the small difference between
1.5°C and 2°C will more than double the global average drought duration (Naumann et al.
2018).
If these predictions are right, then the number of people that is exposed to more or less
compromised food and water security will jump from a few 100s of millions in 2030 to
well over a billion by approximately 2040. Some of those people will perish in famines or
in conflicts over increasingly scarce resources, but a substantial number will try to flee.
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Numbers of climate refugees are often estimated to reach several 100s of millions by 2050
(e.g. Myers 2002;  ESF 2017), but that might be an underestimate in two ways: the real
number  is  likely  to  be  much  higher  (especially  if  other  effects  of  climate  change  and
indirect effects such as societal collapse and civil  war are taken into account),  and the
refugee explosion is likely to start (at least) a decade sooner.
Consequently,  by  2040 about a quarter  of  the  planet  (and possibly even more)  will
already have difficulty to continue functioning “normally”. And that is  just the beginning.
Unless preventive action is taken soon, temperatures, natural disasters, and numbers of
refugees will continue to rise sharply after that. It seems doubtful that many societies will
be able withstand that onslaught for long. Hence, if anything, the 40-year upper bound of
collapse “predicted” by the simulation model seems optimistic.
6. preventing collapse
Much of the projected average temperature increase for the coming two decades is already
locked in. Earth’s climate system does not respond immediately to changes in CO2 levels,
but lags behind a bit. Hence, the warming we experience now is largely due to the CO2 we
have emitted in past decades. It is this warming that is the main driver of the increase in
extreme weather and natural disasters (IPCC 2014; 2018). Warmer oceans produce more
frequent and stronger storms, for example. Warmer poles weaken the jet-streams leading
to more extreme winter weather in the moderate zones. Changing warming patterns lead
to changing wind systems and precipitation patterns, causing droughts and floods. And so
forth.
Effects of climate change like these are distributed unevenly over the planet’s surface,
however. The tropics and subtropics are hit hardest by drought (Central America and the
Middle East are drying out fast, for example), while much of the temperate zones might
only  have  to  deal  with  the  relatively  “minor”  nuisances  of  erratic  weather  (such  as
heatwaves and exceptionally cold winters) and the occasional flood – at least,  for now.
Hence, the parts of the planet that are likely to suffer the worst effects of climate change in
the coming decades are the parts that already have lower mitigation capacities. Given the
projections  of  temperatures,  drought,  and  numbers  of  refugees  mentioned  in  the  last
paragraphs of the preceding section, this will almost certainly mean that a substantial part
of the planet will be pushed beyond its ability to mitigate and will approach or even cross
the threshold of societal collapse before 2040. 
Consequently, the question of how to prevent collapse is not a useful question. We are
already too late  to  prevent collapse,  and should ask instead whether  and how we can
prevent it from enveloping the whole planet, or in other words, whether and how we can
stop it in its track. The model presented here suggests a twofold answer to that question.
Firstly, we must ensure that a sufficiently large part of the planet remains at a disaster
level  that is  below its  mitigation capacity,  and secondly we must prevent that  regional
collapse sets off an unstoppable cascade.
The 2°C average global  warming projected for  the  early  2040s  (Xu,  Ramanathan,  &
Victor 2018) is more or less unavoidable (barring extreme measures),  but we can still
prevent continuing warming after that. If we fail to do so, then we will soon approach or
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even pass several tipping points in the Earth system, many of which are expected to be
located  somewhere  between 1.5°C  and  3°C  (Lenton  et  al. 2008;  Drijfhout  et  al. 2015;
Steffen et al. 2018). Such tipping points tip large parts (or even the whole) of the Earth’s
climate  and biosphere  from  one  more  or  less  stable  situation into  another  –  possibly
unstable – situation. Many tipping points lead to increased warming, and consequently,
passing some of them may set off a cascade of catastrophic changes and accelerated global
warming.  If  we do pass such tipping points  – or in other words,  if  we do pass 2°C of
average global  warming –  then disaster  intensity  will  start  to  increase so  rapidly  that
global societal collapse becomes inevitable.
Consequently, part of what needs to be done to prevent global collapse is to reduce CO2
emissions to zero now, or as soon as possible. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change recently suggested that we have until 2030 to do this (IPCC 2018), but if warming
projections and expectations about tipping points mentioned in the previous paragraph
are right, then the window may actually be considerably narrower than that. Reducing CO2
emissions is only part of the answer, however. They will  help keep a larger part of the
planet at a disaster level below mitigation capacity, but will do little to prevent regional
collapse from spreading beyond control.
There  are  two  main  ways  in  which  societies  (or  countries)  in  the  model  interact:
through trade (t in [E]) and migration (m in [R]). Dependency on trade makes societies
sensitive  to economic  decline  of  their  trade partners.  Globalization has tied the whole
world  together  in  an  ever  denser  trade  network  (especially  since  the  1990s),  and
consequently, regional or even local economic problems can have global implications. (The
impact of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan on worldwide car production is a
well-known example.) To prevent economic collapse from spreading, economies need to
become more resilient and less dependent on long-distance trade. In other words, we need
a de-globalization. (But de-globalization is also necessary to reduce CO₂ emissions, as long-
distance trade has been an important source of increasing emissions since the 1990s.)
Even  more  important  than  economic  resilience  is  refugee  management,  however.  If
substantial parts of the tropics and subtropics experience societal collapse (as suggested
in the previous section) there will be many 100s of millions of climate refugees seeking
food, water, and safety elsewhere. Many will die in famines, droughts, and wars over scarce
resources, but there also will be many that make it to other global regions. Unfortunately,
those will already have too many problems of their own to be able to handle such an influx.
Trying to keep them out is  not an option,  however.  In  Six Degrees,  Mark  Lynas (2007)
wrote  that  “In  a  situation of  serious  conflict,  invaders do not  take kindly  to  residents
denying them food: if a stockpile is discovered, the householder and his family – history
suggests – may be tortured and killed, both for revenge and as a lesson to others” (p. 213).
Something similar will  apply to the national or regional  level:  walls and armed guards
cannot keep out refugees if they number in the millions, and how much trouble they will
cause  for  the  host  society  will  largely  depend  on  how  that  host  society  treats  them.
“Invaders” will not take kindly to host societies that deny them food and shelter.
This is, of course, what the model predicts: refugees tend to spill over borders and add
to the population of displaced people already present there. The extent to which this leads
to an increase in civic unrest depends on mitigation – that is, it depends on whether and
how displaced people are (re)integrated into the host society. If a society is unwilling or
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unable  to  mitigate  the  refugee  problem  (i.e. housing,  feeding,  and  otherwise  helping
refugees,  rather  than rejecting them),  then the rising share  of  displaced people  in the
society’s population will increase its civic unrest level, which – given that the host society
will be facing other problems and natural disasters as well – sooner or later will lead to
collapse.
Consequently,  an  unmitigated  refugee  crisis  of  the  scale  expected  for  the  coming
decades will lead to societal collapse spreading like an oil-stain until it covers the whole
world. And therefore, preventing collapse requires a very different approach to the refugee
problem than what is common now. Rather than building walls and fences to try to keep
refugees out, the world needs a massive resettlement program for climate refugees.
Unfortunately, it seems that none of the policies that are necessary to prevent global
societal collapse will be implemented in the near future. Instead of rapidly reducing CO 2
emissions,  the  fossil  fuel  industry  keeps  drilling  and  the  world  keeps  burning.  Most
countries are becoming more rather than less dependent on (long-distance) trade. And
instead  of  resettling  displaced  people,  most  of  the  rich  countries  that  have  sufficient
mitigation capacity  choose to  hide behind ever  higher  walls  and barriers  (e.g. Parenti
2011; Wainwright & Mann 2018). It is important to realize, however, that we still can avoid
the apocalyptic scenario of global societal collapse. If we do not, that is because we made a
choice not to avoid it, not because we cannot avoid it. (Or actually, most of us will have no
part in that choice,  and the consequences of  the choice made by some others are just
forced upon us. Perhaps, one of the greatest sources of civic unrest in the future will be the
realization of this fact, and the resulting – and entirely justified – anger towards those who
are most to blame for our situation.)
7. discussion
The model presented in this  paper shows that  a continuous increase of  the frequency
and/or severity of  natural  disasters will  gradually  deteriorate societies’  ability  to cope
with those disasters’ effects, leading to rising civic unrest, and ultimately societal collapse.
Many other models predicting collapse have been developed in the past half century, but
the present model differs from the “typical” collapse model in two important ways.
Firstly,  ever  since  Jay  Forrester’s  influential  World1 (Forrester 1971)  and  World3
(Meadows  et al. 1972) models,  the focus has typically been on resource depletion and
pollution as causes of collapse. Recent examples include the HANDY model (Motesharrei,
Rivas,  & Kalnay 2014),  and models  developed by  Bardi (2017) and  Nitzbon,  Heitzig  &
Parlitz (2017). Notwithstanding the common focus on resource depletion and pollution,
there are important differences between these models, of course. The  HANDY model, for
example, includes economic stratification (i.e. inequality) as a key explanatory variable of
collapse. Nevertheless, none of these models awards an important role to natural disasters
or mitigation. (It is possible that the lack of policy influence of these “typical” collapse
models is partially due to their focus on resource depletion and pollution. According to
mainstream, “neo-classical”  economics,  which has a virtual  monopoly on policy advice,
resource depletion does not exist because thanks to technological process and the magic of
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the market alternative (re)sources will always be found, and pollution is an externality that
is usually ignored.)
Secondly, “typical” collapse models are simulation models of complex systems with non-
linear dynamics, and consequently, the implications of these models tend to become visible
only  after  running  many  simulations.  Joseph  Tainter’s  (1988)  model  even  suggests
complexity itself  as  a cause of  collapse.  The present  model  is  not  a simulation model,
however, even if its extension into a simple simulation model was discussed in section 5.
Moreover, it does not involve complexity in the technical sense – it lacks the kind of non-
linear feedback loops that produce the unpredictability that is a hallmark of complexity, for
example.  Instead, the model merely formalizes the rather simple idea that if  mitigation
capacity  is  more or  less  fixed (or  declining)  relative  to the  size  of  the  economy while
disaster intensity continues to grow, then it is a mathematical necessity that sooner or
later disaster damage will exceed mitigation capacity.
In other words, in the model presented here collapse is a mathematical necessity, rather
than the outcome of simulation. And because of that, the model may have more in common
with,  for example,  Malthus’s theory on the divergence between population growth and
food production or Marx’s theory on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, than with the
“typical” collapse models mentioned above. There is, however, a fundamental difference
between those two theories on the mathematical necessity of some kind(s) of catastrophic
events  and  the  model  presented  here.  This  model  only  shows  that  societal  collapse
becomes  inevitable  when  aggregate  disaster  damage  exceeds  a  society’s  mitigation
capacity. This will eventually happen everywhere if climate change remains unchecked, but
the current kind of climate change is a historical contingency and could have been avoided.
(In  fact,  it  almost  was  avoided.  See  Rich 2019.)  And  by  turning  the  tides,  the  most
catastrophic outcome can (probably) still be avoided (see previous section). Hence, while
Malthus and Marx’s (presumed) “catastrophes” are much like natural facts, according to
the model presented here, eventual catastrophe will be our own doing – there is nothing
natural about it.
The  model  presented  here  should  also  be  distinguished  from  scenarios  of  global
societal collapse based on predictions of climate change that have lower probability but
more serious consequences (often called “fat tail” events). In contrast to such scenarios
(see Spratt & Dunlop 2019 for a recent, representative example), the model presented here
does not  assume any kind of  low-probability  events or  low-probability  climate change
effects. Rather, it takes at its starting point the uncontroversial notion that climate change
is already leading to, and will continue to lead to an increase in the frequency and severity
of natural disasters.
Furthermore, while such scenarios tend to involve dates and time-lines, as explained
above (see section 5), the model presented here was not intended to give exact predictions
about the time-frame of collapse, nor about where it will hit first and how it will spread.
Rather, its purpose was to make explicit what should be obvious – namely, that if disaster
intensity continues to increase as climate scientists predict, then eventual global societal
collapse is a mathematical certainty –  and to gain at least some insight on whether and
how global  societal  collapse can (still)  be  prevented (see  section 6).  Nevertheless,  the
model  probably can be adapted and extended into a much more detailed and realistic
simulation model that might be able to produce more accurate predictions about possible
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futures.  This  raises  the  question  of  whether  it  is  actually  worth  doing  that.  It  is  not
immediately obvious that we need detailed predictions of how and when civilization as we
know it is going to end. What we need is to prevent that catastrophe, and that requires
action rather than further research.
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